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THE TROUBLE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 
 
Abstract 
 
If we are to assess whether our attitudes towards nature are morally, aesthetically or in 
any other way appropriate or inappropriate, then we will need to know what those 
attitudes are. Drawing on the works of Katie McShane, Alan Holland and Christine 
Swanton, I challenge the common assumption that to love, respect, honour, cherish or 
adopt any other sort of pro-attitude towards any natural X simply is to value X in 
some way and to some degree. Depending on how one interprets ‘value’, that 
assumption is, I contend, either false or vacuous. I argue that to assess the 
appropriateness of a person’s pro-attitudes towards a natural entity one must in some 
cases appeal to the concepts of status and/or bond, and not just that of value. To 
develop my argument, I appeal to the works of two nature writers – Robert 
Macfarlane and J. A. Baker. 
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THE TROUBLE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 
 
Different environmental ethicists often have different opinions about what we should value. 
They often disagree about what kinds of values different kinds of things can have. But they 
typically assume that environmental ethics is primarily about values and valuing. 
 Not all of those who are concerned about environmental issues would be happy with 
this value-centrism. Martin Heidegger, for instance, once proclaimed that ‘thinking in values 
is the greatest blasphemy imaginable against Being’ (1996: 251). I wouldn’t go that far. But I 
have often wondered whether our preoccupation with values and valuing prevents us from 
understanding some of the various ways that things, organisms, processes, places and events 
matter to us. In the following, I argue that it does. 
 
1. THE HEGEMONY OF VALUES THINKING 
 
What does it mean to say that environmental ethicists are preoccupied with values and 
valuing? One suggestion is that it means that they typically believe the following: 
 
(A) All moral considerations pertaining to our relations with nature can be conceived of in 
terms of nature’s values.1 
 
Yet not even those environmental ethicists who champion what Heidegger calls thinking in 
values would endorse that dubious claim. Take Joseph R. Des Jardins, for example. Although 
he maintains that a ‘full account of value determines the ethical domain’, he devotes a large 
part of his textbook to the analysis of issues which seem to require the application of other 
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moral concepts (2001: 132; my emphasis). He has much to say about duties, rights, virtues 
and justice, for instance. 
A more plausible suggestion is that environmental ethicists are preoccupied with 
values in the sense that they tend to assume that the following statement is true: 
 
(B) All the various ways that nature matters to human beings are best conceived of in 
terms of the values human beings take nature to have. 
 
I am not sure whether environmental ethicists tend to assume that (B) is true. Some of them, 
certainly, would reject it. For example, although Alan Holland has much to say about the 
various ways that natural things, organisms, places, processes and events matter to human 
beings, he worries that the concept of value might be nothing more than ‘an empty place 
holder’ (2009: 510). Like those who practise environmental hermeneutics, he thinks that 
references to meaning tend to shed more light on our moral relations with nature (Holland 
2009, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; cf. Clingerman, Treanor, Drenthen and Utsler 2014). 
 Yet references to meaning have one notable limitation. Suppose we are told that a 
certain wood has personal meaning for Tara. Lacking any context, it is unclear how exactly 
the statement should be interpreted. The reference to personal meaning implies that Tara is 
either positively or negatively orientated towards the place. But it is not clear which way her 
orientation falls. Perhaps the wood is where she used to enjoy playing as a girl; perhaps it is 
where she met her beloved fiancé. But maybe the wood reminds her of some unpleasant event 
that she would rather forget. The bare reference to meaning tells neither way. It is impossible 
to know, from what we are told, whether Tara’s attitude to the wood is positively valenced or 
negatively valenced – whether, in other words, it is a pro-attitude or a con-attitude.2 
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That matter would, however, be settled were we to learn that Tara values the wood. 
Upon learning that, the valence would immediately become clear. Tara’s attitude would 
reveal itself as being a pro-attitude, a metaphorical thumbs up, some sort of ‘hurrah’ rather 
than some sort of ‘boo’. We would conclude that for Tara the world is, all things being equal, 
a better place on account of the wood’s existence. 
These thoughts indicate a third possibility: that environmental ethicists are 
preoccupied with values in the sense that they take the following claim to be true: 
 
(C) To adopt any pro-attitude towards any natural X simply is to value X in some way and 
to some degree.
3
 
 
Which entails: 
 
(D) Any question about whether it is (morally, aesthetically or in any other way) 
appropriate to adopt any pro-attitude towards any natural X simply is a question about 
whether it is appropriate to value X in some way and to some degree. 
 
We environmental ethicists tend to accept both claims. To ask whether we should respect, 
love, esteem, honour, cherish or adopt any other pro-attitude towards any natural X simply is, 
we typically assume, to ask whether it is appropriate to value X in some way and to some 
degree. Indeed, this assumption is so widely held that it is rarely stated, let alone defended. In 
books or papers on environmental ethics, the distinction between instrumental and non-
instrumental values is often made in the first few pages. The various attempts to distinguish 
between objective and subjective values are often discussed a few pages later. But it is 
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typically supposed, without question, that the key question is whether it is apppropriate to 
value nature. 
Are we justified in accepting (C) and (D)? It depends on how those claims are 
interpreted. In what follows, I argue that (C) - and therefore (D) – is either false or vacuous, 
depending on how ‘value’ is interpreted. It follows, I suggest, that if we are to determine 
whether our attitudes towards nature are appropriate, we will need to think not just about 
values and valuing, but about other concepts as well. I argue that we will need to appeal to 
the concepts of status and bond. 
 
2. THREE NOTES ON MY APPROACH 
 
(1) To understand the valence of our attitudes towards anything, one must appeal to 
psychological research. But if one wishes, as I do, to bring that research to bear upon 
metaethics, then one must also engage with moral philosophy.
4
 Now most of those moral 
philosophers who have investigated the topic of attitudinal valence have done so in the 
context of discussing neosentimentalism, and this is not surprising, since neosentimentalists 
hold that to be valuable simply is to be an appropriate object of a pro-attitude.
5
 In what 
follows, however, I do not presuppose the truth of neosentimentalism, nor do I aim to 
contribute to the literature on that topic. In my view, the question of how we are to determine 
what attitudes it is appropriate to adopt towards nature is (or at least should be) of interest to 
environmental ethicists generally, and not just to those who also happen to be 
neosentimentalists. 
(2) My main aims in this paper are descriptive rather than normative. That is to say, 
my primary concern is to understand what attitudes people do in fact have towards nature. It 
is not to argue that any of those attitudes ought or ought not to be taken. 
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(3) When people say they are sceptical about values, they sometimes mean that they 
are sceptical about certain second order claims made about values. Take J. L. Mackie. He is 
sceptical about values in the sense that he denies that they belong to ‘the fabric of the world’ 
(1977: 15-6). Nonetheless, he seems to assume that all first order moral and aesthetic claims 
can be adequately conceived of in terms of values and valuing (see, e.g., 1977: 15). And, as 
one would therefore expect, he seems to assume that all of our pro-attitudes are ultimately 
forms of valuing. My argument is very different. I take no stand on the second order question 
of whether values belong to the fabric of the world. Instead, I ask whether all of our pro-
attitudes are best conceived of as kinds of valuing. In asking this, moreover, I am concerned 
with ‘value’ construed as both a verb (as when one values something) and as a noun (as when 
one finds a certain sort of value in something). 
 
3. THE IMPERTINENCE OF ROCK CLIMBING 
 
In The Wild Places, Robert Macfarlane recounts his abortive attempt to scale the pinnacle of 
Sgurr Dearg on the Isle of Skye: 
 
We had talked of climbing the Pinnacle, had brought ropes to do so. But here, 
suddenly, there seemed neither point nor possibility to such an act. It would be 
dangerous and impertinent. (2007: 57) 
 
Although the reference to impertinence will make some uneasy, it would be uncharitable to 
suppose that Macfarlane is attributing human thoughts and feelings to the Pinnacle. The Wild 
Places is not a fairy tale. So what was Macfarlane’s attitude to that hard-to-scale mass of 
basalt? The fact that he wished not to be impertinent in his dealings with it suggests that his 
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attitude was a pro-attitude, a metaphorical thumbs up. Yet references to thumbs up (or 
thumbs down) are, like A. J. Ayer’s old hurrah/boo theory of metaethics, extremely crude. 
What more can be said about Macfarlane’s pro-attitude towards the peak? 
One plausible suggestion is that Macfarlane felt it would be impertinent to climb the 
Pinnacle because he felt that the thing had a certain status. On this reading, Macfarlane felt it 
would be wrong to climb the Pinnacle in something like the way that it would, in other 
circumstances, be wrong to tease a venerable elder or to use an antique dinner plate as an 
ashtray. Furthermore, just as age is essential to the concepts venerable elder and antique 
dinner plate, so geological antiquity would seem to be part of the Pinnacle’s status. ‘[T]his 
rock had once been fluid’, Macfarlane reflects, just before turning away from the peak. 
‘Aeons ago it had run and dripped and spat.’ (2007: 57) The status of the Pinnacle would 
seem to reflect its immense age.
6
 
The relevant status-acknowledging pro-attitude here is, I believe, respect. For 
Macfarlane, the Pinnacle had a certain status on account of its immense age, and it deserved 
to be treated with respect on account of this status. This is not (or not just) the healthy respect 
that a prudent person will extend to any dangerous thing.
7
 It seems, rather, to be a form of 
what Stephen Darwall (1977) calls recognition respect: a sort of attitude that someone - or in 
this case, something - can be said to deserve.
8
 
Grant, for the sake of argument, that that last claim is true. Suppose that Macfarlane 
really did respect the Pinnacle on account of its status. Can that claim about status and respect 
be plausibly framed in terms of values and valuing? 
If (C) is true, then in principle it can. If (C) is true, then respect, or any other pro-
attitude, simply is a form of valuing. But is (C) true? Katie McShane, for one, would argue 
that it is not.
9
 It is possible, she maintains, to adopt the pro-attitude of respect towards 
something without seeing it as ‘enjoyable, as worthy of favour, or as a good thing for the 
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world to contain’; it is possible, indeed, to respect it without valuing it (2012: 761). To be 
sure, one can consistently value something about X and yet deny that X is of value all things 
considered. Yet McShane is making a bolder claim: that to respect something may not even 
be to value it pro tanto (2013: 753). Nonetheless, McShane continues, even if one does not 
value it, the object of one’s respect will be presented as having a special status: ‘as important, 
as to be taken notice of, as worth attending to in some way or another.’ (2012: 761; emphasis 
removed) And this status will, she adds, bear upon the question of how it may permissibly be 
treated. Regarding something as worthy of respect is, in her view, ‘incompatible with 
regarding it as cheap, dispensable, or a mere convenience, and also incompatible with its 
wanton destruction or exploitation.’ (2012: 761) 
Those claims are plausible. The statement that Person A values X seems to entail that 
A regards it as being pro tanto a good thing that X exists: not necessarily good from the point 
of view of the Universe (if that phrase makes sense), but good, at least, from A’s own 
perspective. This seems to hold true of some pro-attitudes. To cherish or admire X must 
(arguably) be to regard it as being pro tanto a good thing that X exists. Pro-attitudes 
involving respect present a different case, however. Return to the example of the antique 
dinner plate. Even if the object is hideous, it is plausible that it deserves to be treated with 
respect simply because it is old. Alternatively, consider our attitudes to evil elderly people, 
such as Livia from the television drama The Sopranos or her classical namesake, Augustus’s 
aged widow, as portrayed in Robert Graves’s I, Claudius. It is not obviously wrong to think 
that the world would be a better place without such wicked people. Yet one could, without 
inconsistency, believe that the Livias of this world (along with their equally unpleasant male 
counterparts) nonetheless deserve to be treated with respect on account of their great age. 
Something similar may be said of Macfarlane’s attitudes towards the Pinnacle. He did 
not leave the peak unclimbed simply because he valued it. He turned back because he felt that 
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it deserved to be treated with respect. To assess whether Macfarlane’s pro-attitude towards 
the mountain was morally, aesthetically or in any other sense appropriate one must therefore 
ask whether it was appropriate to regard the mountain as having a status that rendered it a 
worthy object of such respect. I will not address that question here. For now, I merely note 
that to answer it one must think in terms of the concept of status and not simply that of value. 
One objection to these claims runs as follows. As we saw, McShane rejects (C). She 
endorses 
 
the narrow sense of ‘valuing’, according to which valuing is just one pro-attitude 
amongst others. 
 
Hence it makes sense for her to ask whether respecting is a form of valuing. Yet the narrow 
sense of ‘valuing’ conflicts with the way that term tends to be used in philosophical debates 
regarding, say, neosentimentalism. Those party to such debates tend to believe that (C) is true 
by definition. They tend, that is, to endorse 
 
the broad sense of ‘valuing’, according to which all pro-attitudes are forms of 
valuing. 
 
On this interpretation, ‘valuing’ is a place-holder term, which can be used to refer to any 
particular pro-attitude. In one case, ‘valuing’ might refer to respect; in another to admiration, 
say, or to love.
10
 So, working with the broad sense of ‘valuing’, to say that Macfarlane 
respected the Pinnacle just is to say that he valued it in some way. 
 That last claim is, I believe, true but unilluminating. The claim that Macfarlane’s 
attitude towards the Pinnacle was one of valuing (in a broad sense) tells us nothing about the 
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specific nature of that attitude. For sure, one could try to be more precise by writing of non-
instrumental value, rather than just value. Yet this claim would also be unilluminating. To say 
that Macfarlane took the Pinnacle to have non-instrumental value is little more – maybe 
nothing more – than another way of saying what we already knew: that he felt it would be in 
some sense wrong to ‘use’ the thing by climbing it. Here, Holland’s worries about the 
concept of value appear to be justified. To say that Macfarlane saw value (in a broad sense) in 
the Pinnacle is, it would seem, to use ‘value’ as nothing more than an empty place holder (cf. 
Holland 2009: 510). 
 In sum, then, the example of Macfarlane’s encounter with the Pinnacle casts doubt on 
(C). If ‘value’ is construed in a narrow sense, then (C) would seem to be false. If it is 
construed in a broad sense, then (C) would appear to be vacuous. Either way, it is hard to see 
how talk of values and valuing could do justice to the phenomenology of that encounter. 
 
4. FALCONS AND OTHER FELLOW CREATURES 
 
J. A. Baker’s book The Peregrine provides a second example of the limits of what Heidegger 
called ‘thinking in values’, though one which illustrates the importance of bonds rather than 
status. 
The Peregrine is a breathtakingly beautiful account of Baker’s observations of 
peregrine falcons in the fens and fields of East Anglia. It is also a striking expression of 
misanthropy. Baker records his hatred of ‘the sound of man’ and his desire to ‘let the human 
taint wash away in emptiness and silence as the fox sloughs his smell into the cold 
unworldliness of water’ (2005: 144, 10). Identifying with the falcons he follows, he writes 
that: 
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We live, in these days in the open, the same ecstatic fearful life. We shun men. We 
hate their suddenly uplifted arms, the insanity of their flailing gestures, their erratic 
scissoring gait, their aimless stumbling ways, the tombstone whiteness of their faces. 
(2005: 95) 
 
Upon finding a gravely injured heron, partly frozen to the ground, Baker notes that all was 
dead in the bird but ‘the fear of man’. ‘We are the killers’, he reflects: ‘We stink of death. We 
carry it with us. It sticks to us like frost. We cannot tear it away’ (2005: 121). 
As in the works of writers such as Robinson Jeffers, Baker’s misanthropy can be 
contrasted with his love of wild animals. The following passage from the opening chapter of 
The Peregrine is a case in point: 
 
I came late to the love of birds. For years I saw them only as a tremor at the edge of 
vision. They know suffering and joy in simple states not possible for us. Their lives 
quicken and warm to a pulse our hearts can never reach. They race to oblivion. They 
are old before we have finished growing. (2005: 10) 
 
Later on, Baker expresses his feelings about the animals that must face the harshness of 
winter: 
 
There is an animal mystery in the light that sets upon the fields like a frozen muscle 
that will flex and wake at sunrise. I feel compelled to lie down in this numbing 
density of silence, to companion and comfort the dying in these cold depths at the foot 
of the solstice: those… whose blood now courses from the hunting frost, whose frail 
hearts choke in the clawed frost’s bitter grip. (2005: 123-4) 
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What pro-attitudes are expressed in those last two passages? One option is love – the love 
Baker professed for birds. If we follow McShane in adopting a narrow sense of valuing, then 
it makes sense to ask whether loving is a form of valuing. Is it? Many would contend that it is 
not. So, for instance, Roberta De Monticelli maintains that ‘you do not love someone because 
she is a person of value’ (2006: 64-5). Holland agrees. There is, he writes, 
 
a subtle though clear distinction between the logic of ‘love’ and the logic of ‘value’. 
Love is something one declares, or is smitten by; one does not declare or profess 
one’s intrinsically valuing attitude to someone… (2011a: 385) 
 
Likewise, Christine Swanton argues that to understand the phenomenon of love one must 
refer to concepts other than that of value. To make her case, she asks the reader to imagine a 
scenario in which a kidney surgeon with three children is forced to decide whether to kill one 
child to save the lives of the two others. Swanton concedes that doing so may well bring 
about a state of affairs which, all things considered, would be ‘less disvaluable’ than a state of 
affairs in which the two children were left to die (2003: 217). Still, she claims that it would be 
wrong to use any of one’s children in this way, even to achieve a valuable end. Doing so, 
would, she maintains, amount to  
 
an extraordinarily serious violation of a love bond between parent and child. 
Requirements of bonding demand that one not do this, but that one grieve in great 
sorrow for the children who die as a result of inability to treat. Demands of bonding, 
then, do not track demands of value. (2003: 217) 
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Granted, some would claim that to love X must be to think that the world is, all things being 
equal, a better place because of X’s existence. And if that claim is true, then love, unlike 
respect, would seem necessarily to involve valuing (in the narrow sense). Nonetheless, De 
Monticelli, Holland and Swanton are surely right to say that it cannot be reduced to a form of 
valuing.
11
 So, when Baker says that he loves birds, he is not saying merely that he values 
them (in the narrow sense). Even if he stopped short of declaring his love for birds, his 
attitudes towards them cannot be entirely captured in talk of values and valuing. 
 Turn now to the broad sense of ‘valuing’. Is it the case that Baker valued birds and 
other wild animals in this sense? It is unilluminating to say that he did. Whether or not 
Swanton (2003: 103) is right to say that loving is ‘basically a bond-based response’, she is, I 
believe, right to draw attention to the bond-based nature of some of our pro-attitudes. 
Certainly, Baker’s attitudes towards birds seem to reflect his sense of his bonds with them. 
Birds may race to oblivion, yet we are also headed there, albeit at a slower pace. The frail 
hearts of animals may choke in clawed frost’s bitter grip, yet eventually we too will die and 
grow cold. Baker’s writings beautifully convey the sense that animals are what Cora 
Diamond once called ‘fellows in mortality’, those with whom one feels a sense of common 
fate.
12
 To understand why Baker felt compelled to companion and comfort the dying, one 
must refer not just to the value he saw in animals, but also to his sense of these bonds. True, 
this fellow feeling probably wasn’t reciprocated. While Baker felt close to the animals, it is 
very unlikely that they felt close to him. Nonetheless, it is because he felt so bonded that he 
was moved to compassion.
13
 
The same general point holds true of Baker’s misanthropy. It is not (or not just) the 
case that Baker found little value in human beings; that he saw humans as we see them but 
simply accorded them less value. It is not that they shone less brightly in his moral universe. 
For Baker, in his more misanthropic moments, human beings are no longer fellow women and 
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men, no longer those who love and are loved, who have mothers and fathers, who sometimes 
long for security and comfort, and who fear illness and death. They are others: those against 
whom one defines oneself. 
The point can be made with reference to an anecdote from George Orwell. In his 
essay ‘Looking Back at the Spanish War’, Orwell recounts how, hunkered down in his 
trench, he spotted an enemy soldier running across the parapet not far from him. He took aim 
and was about to squeeze the trigger when he noticed that the man was holding up his 
trousers as he ran. Orwell found himself unable to fire. ‘I had come here’, he writes, ‘to shoot 
at “Fascists”, but a man who is holding up his trousers is not a “Fascist”, he is visibly a 
fellow-creature, similar to yourself, and you do not feel like shooting at him’.14 Orwell came 
to see this man as a fellow man. I suspect that Baker’s transformation was in the opposite 
direction. As the narrative of The Peregrine unfolds and Baker comes increasingly to identify 
with the hawks he follows, he starts to see human beings less as fellow men and women and 
more as he thinks a hawk must see them: as objects of hatred and fear. To reiterate, that 
transformation is not best conceived of in terms of his coming to value people less and 
animals more. To understand it, one must refer to Baker’s changing bonds with animals and 
people. And to assess whether Baker’s attitudes towards animals and people were morally, 
aesthetically or in any other sense appropriate one must therefore ask whether his bonds with 
them were appropriate. I will not address that question here. For now, it is enough to note that 
the question calls for one to consider not just values and valuing, but also bond-related 
attitudes such as compassion and pity. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
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To recap: Environmental ethicists tend to accept both (C) and (D). Each of those claims can 
be taken to have either of two meanings, depending on how the word ‘value’ is interpreted. In 
a narrow sense, according to which valuing is one sort of pro-attitude amongst others, it 
makes sense to ask whether any particular pro-attitude is a form of valuing. If McShane is 
correct, then in some cases the answer will be ‘no’. Respecting, she argues, is not a form of 
valuing. It is true that one could work with a broad sense of ‘value’, according to which all 
pro-attitudes are forms of valuing. And working with this very diffuse sense of ‘value’, one 
could no doubt frame Macfarlane’s attitudes to mountains, or Baker’s to peregrines, as forms 
of valuing. But maybe, by the same token, one could translate both into talk of ecosystem 
stocks and services or, even worse, the Newspeak of Orwell’s 1984. Perhaps it could be done; 
however, the exercise would be unilluminating. One’s description of the attitudes would, in 
each case, be poor – and poorer than it would have been had one appealed to other 
concepts.
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I have tried to avoid taking a stand on normative questions. So I have not argued that 
mountains ought to be treated with respect or that we ought to try to regard nonhuman 
animals as fellow creatures. Instead, my aim has been descriptive. I have set out to 
understand how mountains, birds and (by implication) other parts of the natural world do in 
fact matter to us. I have argued that if we are systematically to determine whether our pro-
attitudes towards these various things, organisms, processes, places and events are 
appropriate, then we will need an adequate account of what those pro-attitudes are. To 
develop such an account, moreover, I have suggested that we will need to work with a rich 
conceptual palette. Talk of pro-attitudes in the abstract certainly is not enough. Value 
pluralism is a step in the right direction. But it isn’t enough either. No, if we are to understand 
the various ways that nature matters to us, then we will need to consider status, bonds and, I 
expect, a range of other concepts as well.
16
 
15 
 
That would only be a first step, however. Trying to comprehend our various pro-
attitudes towards nature (or anything else) is not simply a matter of identifying more and 
more such attitudes. The relations between the various attitudes must be considered, too. It 
must also be asked whether some pro-attitudes can only be taken up by a person if she is 
already attuned in some more general and basic way towards the world.
17
 I do not have space 
to pursue these complicated and difficult matters here, still less to consider how my 
discussion of environmental valuing relates to valuing in general. All I have tried to show is 
that we will need to take account of more than just values and valuing if we are to assess 
whether our pro-attitudes towards nature are appropriate.
18
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1
 By ‘nature’ or ‘the natural world’ I mean those parts of the biosphere whose current states 
are not for the most part the intended products of human actions – lynxs and taiga, for 
example, rather than hair dryers and shopping malls. That is not, I stress, my definition of 
‘nature’. It is just a rough and ready way of indicating what I mean to refer to when I use that 
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word. For the purposes of this paper, that rough sketch should, however, be enough. At least, 
the argument I develop below does not presuppose any more precise or defensible conception 
of what nature is. 
2
 It is true that Tara might have both pro- and con-attitudes towards the wood. It is likely, 
moreover, that some of her attitudes towards the place fall into neither category. However, 
my aim in this paragraph is not to provide a comprehensive account of Tara’s attitudes 
towards the wood. It is simply to clarify the distinction between the concept of a pro-attitude 
and that of a con-attitude..  
3
 Although, in what follows, I focus on the relations between pro-attitudes and valuing, the 
claims I make are also meant to apply, mutatis mutandis, to the relations between con-
attitudes and disvaluing. 
4
 See further, McShane 2013: 748, n.1. For a summary of the psychological literature on 
attitudinal valence, see Prinz 2004: Chapter 7. 
5
 See, for instance, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004: 401, McShane 2013. 
McShane 2011 provides a good introduction to neosentimentalist views and their bearing on 
environmental ethics. 
6
 On the relations between status and age, see Erich Hatala Matthes’s account of how 
‘historical artifacts expand our access to times from which we are otherwise isolated’, in a 
way that can ‘offer a sense of unity with the significant moments that have shaped both the 
earth and ourselves.’ (2013: 62; cf. Swanton 2003: 44-5, James 2013) The reference to the 
earth indicates that Matthes takes this to apply to natural historical artifacts, such as 
mountains, and not just to material culture.  
7
 See further, Williams 1992: 67; Darwall 1977: 40. 
8
 Mountaineers often say that mountains deserve this sort of respect. Consider, for instance, 
the frequently voiced claim that Cesare Maestri’s high-impact climbing techniques evinced a 
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lack of respect for Cerro Torre in Patagonia. See 
http://www.thecleanestline.com/2012/02/cerro-torre-deviations-from-reason.html [and] 
http://www.alpinist.com/doc/web12w/newswire-kruk-kennedy-statement [both accessed on 
30 June 2014] 
9
 To be accurate, she suggests that if Kantian respect is a pro-attitude (and there is, she 
acknowledges, some debate on this question), then it does not seem to be a kind of valuing 
(see McShane 2013: 760-1). 
10
 Cf. Holmes Rolston III’s claim that ‘value’ just is ‘the generic noun for any positive 
predicate’ (1989: 74). The subsequent discussion implies that to ask whether our attitudes 
towards nature should be positively or negatively valenced simply is to ask whether nature 
has economic, life support, recreational, scientific, aesthetic, life, diversity, unity, stability, 
spontaneity, dialectical or sacramental value (see 1989: 74ff). 
11
 That claim is, I admit, open to question. Although my intuitions about love match those of 
De Monticelli, Holland and Swanton, others see things differently. For instance, both J. 
David Velleman (1999: 362) and Irving Singer (2009) maintain that love is at root a form of 
valuing (an ‘arresting awareness of value in a person’ and a bestowal of value, respectively). 
Adjudicating this matter requires argument, and not just the comparison of intuitions. 
Unfortunately, however, there is not enough space, here, to defend the claim that loving 
cannot be reduced to valuing. So I can only ask readers to accept that whether or not it is true, 
that claim is at least plausible. 
12
 Diamond 1978: 474; cf. Gaita 2003: 123. 
13
 Two points: (1) It might be objected that Baker could not really have suffered with the 
animals - either because the animals themselves were mere mechanisms and so incapable of 
suffering or (more plausibly) because their sufferings were too unlike Baker’s for sympathy 
to be possible. But even if Baker did not feel compassion, he might nonetheless have been 
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moved to pity. For, as Brian Carr (1999: 428) points out, ‘Compassion rests upon an 
appreciation of the suffering as conceived by the one who suffers, whereas pity involves a 
grasp of the misfortune of which the sufferer is unaware.’ In fact, Diamond (1978, pp. 474-5) 
connects the sense that animals are ‘fellows in mortality’ with the concept of pity. (2) 
Swanton implies that compassion is, like love, a bond-based response (2003: 24). I am not 
sure that it is. Consider Buddhist conceptions of compassion (karuṅā). The following claims 
form an inconsistent set: (a) bonds are attachments, (b) an awakened person is necessarily 
without any attachments, (c) karuṅā is a bond-based response, and (d) an awakened person 
can exhibit karuṅā. One way to try to restore consistency would be to deny (b), by suggesting 
that the development of karuṅā involves the expansion and transformation of one’s bonds 
with others, rather than their eradication (see Jenkins 2013: 466-7). Another would be to deny 
(c), by claiming that karuṅā is unlike ordinary, bond-based compassion. 
14
 Orwell 1968: 254; cf. Diamond 1978: 477. 
15
 Couldn’t one say, at least, that Macfarlane valued the Pinnacle because of its status or that 
Baker valued birds because of his bonds with them? Certainly, this could be said. But it is not 
clear that much would be gained by saying it. For once we know that Macfarlane saw the 
Pinnacle as a worthy object of respect, what does it add to say that he valued it as an object of 
respect? The nature of his response can be captured by referring to status and respect; no 
appeal to the concepts of value and valuing is needed. Similarly, once we know that Baker 
felt compassion for the birds he regarded as fellow creatures, what is added by saying that he 
valued them because he saw them as fellow creatures? Everything that needs to be said about 
Baker’s response can be said in terms of bond-based concepts. Again, no appeals to value are 
required. In such contexts, references to value are, as Holland maintains, ‘dispensable’ 
(2011b: 317). 
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16
 Cf. Iris Murdoch’s (1961: 20) claim that ‘We need more concepts’ if we are to make 
‘moral progress’. 
17
 Despite my cheap shot at Heidegger in the opening section, I think it is likely that his 
account of a Grundstimmung, a fundamental attunement or mood, would prove useful here. 
See further, Swanton 2010. 
18
 As one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper pointed out, it may be worth investigating 
how the thesis defended above bears upon the body of empirical research on the relations 
between environmental attitudes and environmental behaviours. Consider, for example, Anja 
Kollmuss and Julian Agyeman’s (2002: 252) claim that the impact of the former on the latter 
is ‘usually very small’. It would be interesting to test whether a more fine-grained analysis of 
attitudes, couched in terms of concepts such as respect and not just values and valuing, would 
reveal a closer connection between environmental attitudes and environmental behaviours. 
